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ABSTRACT: In Doe v. Division of Youth & Family Services,' a hospital
employee sought state intervention when an HIV-positive woman refused to
comply with treatment recommendations during her pregnancy that would
drastically reduce the chances of mother-to-child-transmission (MTCT),
eventually triggering a lawsuit against the hospital. With an increase in the
number of HIV-positive women becoming pregnant and the courts avoiding
constitutional analysis of a woman's right to refuse medical treatment, there is
a clear void where legal analysis is surely needed. This Article fills this void
for the inevitable case where an HIV-positive pregnant woman's right to refuse
medical treatment is weighed against the state interest in the fetus. Abortion
case law recognizes and upholds the state interest in fetal life, but state interest
in fetal health has yet to be established as a compelling interest which may
override the constitutionally protected right of the woman. Meanwhile,
compelled-treatment jurisprudence has unfailingly relied on protecting the
potentiality of life. As such, this Article demonstrates that prior precedent
demands a pregnant woman's liberty interest in bodily integrity be protected,
as opposed to further relegating pregnant women into a group of second-class
citizens whose right to refuse treatment is weakened by the mere fact of
pregnancy. In ignoring prior jurisprudence, a court would sustain the stigma
surrounding HIV and cause regression in education. Meanwhile, examining the
issue through a public health lens reveals that a genuine interest in fetal health
would support education rather than compelled treatment to ensure HIV-
positive pregnant women are not driven from the health care system they
clearly need.
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HIV is the leading cause of death worldwide for women ages 15 to 49.2 In
the United States, despite overall incidences of HIV infection remaining stable,
young women from racial minority groups are more likely to be infected than
ever before.3 Young women ages 13 to 39 account for approximately 64% of
new HIV cases among women, with the youngest women in that age bracket
accounting for more than a third of all new infections. Racial minorities are
disproportionately represented in these outcomes: nearly 80% of the cases in
5these age groups are African-American and Hispanic women.
Part of the explanation for this dramatic rise in infections for women, and
young women specifically, is that heterosexual transmission is becoming an
increasingly common cause of new HIV infections.6 Women are
physiologically more susceptible to HIV infection than men7 and are, therefore,
twice as likely as men to contract HIV from unprotected sex with an infected
partner.8 This medical fact helps explain why heterosexual transmission is the
2. U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, Fact Sheet: Women, Girls, Gender Equality, and HIV (2012),
http://www.unaids.org/en/medialunaids/contentassets/documents/factsheet/2012/20120217_FSWomen
Girls en.pdf.
3. Nadine E. Chen, Jaimie P. Meyer & Sandra A. Springer, Advances in the Prevention of
Heterosexual Transmission of HIV/AIDS Among Women in the United States, 3 INFECTIOUS DISEASE
REP. 20, 20-21 (2011).
4. See Joseph Prejean et al., Estimated HIV Incidence in the United States, 2006-2009, 6 PLOS
ONE 1, 5-11 tbis. 1-4 (2011).
5. Id.
6. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FACT SHEET: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN THE UNITED
STATES (2012), http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/3029-12.pdf.
7. Thomas C. Quinn & Julie Overbaugh, HIV/AIDS in Women: An Expanding Epidemic, 308 SC].
1582, 1582-83 (2005).
8. Jennifer Tang & Nawal M. Nour, HIV and Pregnancy in Resource-Poor Settings, 3 REV.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 66, 67 (2010).
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primary method of HIV contraction for women. 9 Young women in particular
are at risk, as nearly one-third of girls 14 to 17 reported a condom was not used
in their most recent experience of sexual intercourse.10
With an increased prevalence of HIV in women, and with young women
specifically at risk, a number of legal and ethical questions arise about the care
these women should receive if they become pregnant. Among the most
important of these is how to reduce mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of
HIV. In the last two decades, rates of MTCT of HIV during pregnancy and
birth have fallen as a result of the 076 Protocol." In this three-step process,
physicians administer the antiretroviral zidovudine, or AZT, to the woman at or
after fourteen weeks of pregnancy, intravenously during delivery, and to the
newborn for six weeks after birth.12 When combined with elective cesarean
section (c-section) deliveries and the absence of breastfeeding, MTCT of HIV
falls to less than 2%.'1 But these and other recommended treatments are
lengthy and cumbersome, and not all pregnant women will want or be able to
undergo them.14
In 2005, 92% of children under the age of 13 with AIDS were believed to
have acquired HIV from their mother. 15 And while perinatal infections
continue to occur across all racial subgroups, the majority of newly infected
children are African-American.' 6 These outcomes signal that many women are
not receiving the kind of pre- and perinatal care necessary to prevent MTCT.
A number of factors are likely in play. First, many patients receive health
care from a fractured health care system that does not properly test for HIV,
communicate the results to patients, and deliver the information and medical
9. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FACT SHEET: WOMEN AND HIV/AIDS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2012), http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/6092-09.pdf.
10. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FACT SHEET: SEXUAL HEALTH OF ADOLESCENTS AND
YOUNG ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/3040-05
-2.pdf.
I1. Edward M. Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type I with Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1994).
12. Id. at 1174, 1178. The transmission rate was reduced from 25.5% to 8.3%. Id. at 1176. For the
purposes of this paper, these rates will be utilized and referred to, using approximations of 25% and 8%.
It is also worth noting that the antepartum medication must be taken orally five times a day. Id. at 174.
13. Achievements in Public Health: Reduction in Perinatal Transmission of HIV Infection-United
States, 1985-2005, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 592, 592 (2006) [hereinafter
Achievements in Public Health],
14. Another method that is currently used to reduce MTCT is providing nevirapine at delivery and
nevirapine syrup to infants after birth. Andrea L. Ciaranello et al., What Will It Take to Eliminate
Pediatric HIV? Reaching WHO Target Rates of Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in Zimbabwe: A
Model-Based Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2012). Also, using a triple-drug antiretroviral (ARV) regimen
throughout pregnancy and breastfeeding can lead to the desired reduction in MTCT. Id. In this Article,
specific treatment methods may be mentioned at certain points, but the general term of "MTCT
treatment" may be used as well to refer to any of the drug therapies.
15. Id.
16. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 9, at 1.
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care required to prevent transmission.' 7 In some cases, providers perform
routine HIV testing only for pregnant women who fall into a group they
consider high risk.'8 Women who are not tested and those who seroconvert
during pregnancy are therefore removed from the realm of MTCT treatment
options.19 Meanwhile, evidence suggests that there are significant breakdowns
in communication between women with HIV and their physicians with regard
to reproductive issues, with many never discussing the possibility of having
children. 20
Women can also contribute to their susceptibility to these problems by
delaying their entry into the health care system.21 Fear of stigma and
discrimination, barriers to care such as poverty or lack of insurance, and beliefs
about their health, medications, and the health care system in general can delay
HIV testing and proper care for women, especially minorities.22 This means
that HIV-positive women may not seek medical attention until after they are
23pregnant or show symptoms of the disease. Those accessing care in the later
stages of pregnancy can be equally problematic; for example, there is a rising
number of teenagers who were perinatally infected and are nonadherent to their
treatment regimens who then access care very late.24
There also are various reasons why people living with HIV may decide to
delay or avoid conventional therapies, including the long-term effects of
treatment, side effects, or faith in alternative treatments. 25 And a pregnant
woman may have even more anxiety about the drugs she puts into her body.26
17. See Pierre M. Barker, Wendy Mphatswe & Nigel Rollins, Antiretroviral Drugs in the Cupboard
Are Not Enough: The Impact of Health Systems' Performance on Mother to Child Transmission of HIV,
56 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME e45, e45 (2011).
18. Elijah Paintsil & Warren A. Andiman, Update on Successes and Challenges Regarding Mother-
to-Child Transmission of HIV, 21 CURRENT OPINION PEDIATRICS 94, 97 (2009).
19. Id.
20. Kathleen E. Squires et al., Health Needs of HIV Infected Women in the United States: Insights
from the Women Living Positive Survey, 25 AIDS PATIENT CARE 279, 279 (2011).
21. See Mariam Aziz & Kimberly Y. Smith, Challenges and Successes in Linking HIV-Infected
Women to Care in the United States, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S231, S233 (2011) (stating that
women are more likely to delay starting treatment than men with HIV).
22. Id. at S232-34 (2011). See also Paintsil & Andiman, supra note 18, at 95 (discussing the
differences in the time of initiation of medication for HIV-positive pregnant women based on
race/ethnicity); Squires et al., supra note 20, at 283 (finding that HIV-positive women may keep their
status confidential as long as possible and may be hesitant to seek medical care for fear of losing their
children and likelihood that their children may be ostracized).
23. Aziz & Smith, supra note 21, at S232; see also Squires et al., supra note 20, at 281 ("[Forty-
two percent] of those who were currently pregnant or who had been pregnant were either 'not very
aware' or 'not at all aware' of the treatment options for pregnant women with HIV.").
24. Paintsil & Andiman, supra note 18, at 97.
25. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, No Way to Treat a Woman: Creating an Appropriate Standard for
Resolving Medical Treatment Disputes Involving HIV-Positive Children, 25 1ARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 221,
238 (2002). Another reason may be a patient's understanding of her inability to stick with the strict
medication schedule. Id. at n.10.
26. See Karalyn McDonald & Maggie Kirkman, HIV-Positive Women in Australia Explain Their
Use and Non-Use of Antiretroviral Therapy in Preventing Mother to Child Transmission, 23 AIDS
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With the constant advice that pregnant women avoid certain medications,
drugs, alcohol, and specific foods, taking treatment to reduce HIV transmission
can be psychologically taxing and can cause women to only partially adhere to
the recommended regimen.27 Furthermore, a woman may decline MTCT
treatment because she has already used the drug therapy unsuccessfully. 28 In
addition, some research finds that women who are knowledgeable about their
condition and are aware of their low viral load may fear that the risk of toxicity
is greater than the risk of transmission; it is apparent that the reasons for
declining accepted medical treatment are virtually endless. 29
The case of an HIV-positive pregnant woman who declines to follow
medical advice that would reduce the chance of transmitting HIV to her fetus
raises important legal and ethical questions about the fetus that she plans to
carry to term. For example, in Doe v. Division of Youth & Family Services,30 a
woman who was tested for HIV without her consent decided to halt her AZT
treatment during pregnancy, refused treatment during delivery, and refused to
permit hospital staff to administer the recommended treatment after birth.31 For
these reasons, the hospital placed the baby in protective custody so that
hospital personnel could administer AZT. A court order returned the baby to
the mother with mandatory in-home visits to ensure proper administration of
treatment.32 When the mother notified hospital personnel that she had ceased
the AZT, the baby was again taken from her and the mother was charged with
abuse and neglect. 33 The back-and-forth eventually came to an end when the
baby tested negative for HIV five-and-a-half months after birth.34
Ultimately, there was no forced medical treatment and this case was not
decided on constitutional grounds, but cases concerning the possibility of
forcing MTCT treatment upon an HIV-positive pregnant woman certainly
would have to address competing interests of the woman and the state. As will
be discussed in further detail below, 35 the state has a distinct interest in the life
CARE 578, 579 (2011) (discussing the anxiety women felt about the toxicity of treatment and potentially
detrimental effects on their babies). See generally Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 238 (examining an
analogous situation where a woman's child has HIV, and how she is less likely to medicate her child
with treatment that she deems inappropriate for herself).
27. McDonald & Kirkman, supra note 26, at 580.
28. See generally In re Nikolas E., 720 A.2d 562, 563 (Me. 1998) (providing an example of a
woman who refused to provide her son with the recommended HIV treatment because of her experience
with HIV therapy and the tragic death of her four-year-old daughter).
29. See McDonald & Kirkman, supra note 26, at 581 (finding that even a personal and respectful
relationship between a physician and a woman who is educated and experienced with her disease does
not ensure compliance with medical recommendations).
30. 148 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D.N.J. 2001).
31. Id. at 472.
32. Id. at 472-73.
33. Id. at 473.
34. Id. at 472-73.
35. See infra Part II (describing case law establishing a state interest in the fetus).
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of a fetus after viability, especially if the woman plans to bring the baby to
term. In addition, there is a state interest in the potential costs to society
associated with a baby with HIV. Some estimates have placed HIV treatment
36
costs for an adult at approximately $2,100 per month. Medication for infants
with HIV typically costs 50-90% more than medication for adults despite using
the same agents.3 7 This can place a substantial burden on the health care
system, with the federal government, states, and private insurers already seeing
substantial increases in paying HIV-related medical costs.38 Reports say that
the cost of HIV care in the United States has increased significantly since the
introduction of antiretroviral therapy (ART) and it is expected that the cost will
continue to grow. 39 Given the high costs of caring for a child born with HIV
and that HIV-positive women are disproportionately low-income, 40 it becomes
apparent that the state could end up footing much of the bill.
Cases of forced c-sections, blood transfusions, and other medical
interventions for the benefit of the fetus illustrate that forced MTCT treatment
is certainly a possibility. This possibility implicates the right to refuse medical
treatment, which is a widely recognized constitutional right that should not be
overshadowed by the state's interest in a fetus that will ultimately live.
Considerations that apply when the fetus will or will not live as a result of the
decision are not relevant here. 41 Thus, to focus on case law that trumpets the
state's interest in fetal life would be misguided. Moreover, to eschew advances
in medication and label HIV a death sentence would only add to the
unwarranted stigma the disease still carries.
A decision in the type of case that requires balancing the woman's right to
refuse medical treatment and the state's interest in the fetus could have larger
implications beyond HIV-positive pregnant women. To tip the scales toward
state intervention would ultimately undermine an important right that should be
protected, continue to place pregnant women in a class whose rights are not as
protected as others, and potentially create a public health problem rather than
solve one.
Therefore, this Article seeks to fill the void of constitutional analysis in
this type of case. In Part I, the legal foundation of a woman's right to refuse
medical treatment is discussed. In Part II, it is juxtaposed against the state's
36. Bruce R. Schackman et al., The Lifetime Cost of Current Human Immunodeficiency Virus Care
in the United States, 44 MED. CARE 990, 994 (2006).
37. Nicole C. Schmidt et al., Costs and Benefits ofMultidrug, Multidose Antiretroviral Therapy for
Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV in the Dominican Republic, 116 INT'L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 219, 221 (2012).
38. Schackman et al., supra note 36, at 995. With increased costs and longer lifespans, there is also
the possibility that lifetime cost caps for insured patients may be reached well before the end of life. Id.
39. Id.
40. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 9 (demonstrating that nearly two-thirds of
women with HIV/AIDS had annual incomes below $10,000).
41. See infra Part Ill.A (discussing the state interests in fetal life versus fetal health).
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interest in the fetus. The state's interests are illustrated through case law
concerning abortion, pregnant women refusing other medical procedures, and
the authority of the state to protect the public's health. Each of the state
interests and their legal underpinnings are analyzed to show that not only are
these cases not analogous to the situation in question, but a proper reading of
legal and ethical doctrines insists that a court respect the woman's decision.
Finally, Part III discusses the state's interests in the potentiality of life versus
fetal health, and examines the important policy factors that a court should
consider when determining whether to force medical treatment on a pregnant
woman on behalf of the state's interests. Unsurprisingly, these policy factors
not only indicate that treatment should not be compelled, but suggest that to
compel it would create more harm than good.
I. THE WOMAN'S RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The right to refuse medical treatment was recognized as a constitutionally
protected right in the historic case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
42
of Health. In this case, the Court recognized that this constitutionally
protected liberty was one that had evolved from the right of self-determination,
a right established and protected by the common law. In fact, the Court noted
that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." 43 The Court stated that this right to bodily
integrity stemmed from the universally accepted doctrine of informed consent,
meaning that every person of adult years and sound mind has a right to decide
what will be done with his or her own body.4 For if a person can grant
informed consent, surely a person also possesses the right not to consent, that
is, to refuse medical treatment, as well.
In Cruzan, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment provided a
"constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment."46 The Due Process Clause protects not only a liberty interest in the
life of a person, but also an interest in refusing treatment that would help
sustain that life.4 7 The legal right to refuse treatment is backed by the essential
ethical principle of autonomy, which, at a minimum, protects the right of each
person to make voluntary and informed decisions free from interference and
42. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
43. Id. at 269 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 270.
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id. at 281.
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48limitations by others. Therefore, with informed consent, an individual should
be free to decline any medical treatment that she decides she does not want.
However, a person's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment is not
absolute. In Cruzan, the Court also stated that even when dealing with a
person's constitutionally protected liberty interests, a decisionmaker must
balance such interests against relevant state interests to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. 49 The four interests of the state that may
provide a basis for limiting a person's right to refuse medical treatment are:
"the preservation of life, the protection of the interests of innocent third parties,
the prevention of suicide, and the preservation of the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. . . ."so
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court utilized these limitations in order
to differentiate between allowing a person to die by refusing medical treatment
and facilitating someone's death by physician-assisted suicide. Despite the
Court finding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not offer a right to
physician-assisted suicide, the Court reaffirmed the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment grounded in the Due Process Clause.52 The Court found that
this right to refuse medical treatment could objectively be categorized as a
fundamental right deeply rooted in the tradition and history of the United States
and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 3 Because this right could be
described carefully, it satisfied the second prong of the Court's substantive due
process analysis. 54 This long legal tradition of protecting the right to refuse
medical treatment contrasts with physician-assisted suicide, which had never
garnered such legal confirmation and, therefore, could not counter the weight
of the state's interest in preserving life.55
In another case, Vacco v. Quill,5 the Court again isolated physician-
assisted suicide from the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 In this
case, which focused on the Equal Protection Clause, the Court did not find
similarities between terminally ill patients on life support who could hasten
death by refusing this medical treatment and those who wished to hasten death
48. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58 (5th ed.
2001). "To respect an autonomous agent is, at a minimum, to acknowledge that person's right to hold
views, to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and beliefs . . . Respect, on this
account, involves acknowledging decision-making rights and enabling persons to act autonomously." Id.
at 63.
49. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
50. Id. at 271.
51. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
52. Id. at 720.
53. Id. at 721.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 725-26.
56. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
57. Id. at 807-08.
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by physician-assisted suicide.58 Yet the Court made it a point to reassert that
every competent individual maintains a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
regardless of physical condition.59
This right has been upheld on the state level as well. In Stamford Hospital
v. Vega,o the Connecticut Supreme Court found that Vega, a Jehovah's
witness who had refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds, had had her
fundamental right to refuse treatment violated when she was given the
procedure in order to save her life.61 Focusing on the common law right of
bodily self-determination, the court found that if this right was to be respected,
62
that respect had to extend even to situations of life and death. Therefore,
given Vega's clear and informed decision to refuse blood even in the face of
death, the court found that the trial court and hospital erred in weighing the
state's interest in preserving life more heavily. 63
In In re Hughes, another case of a Jehovah's Witness refusing blood, the
Superior Court of New Jersey held that the woman's rights were not violated
only because there was some uncertainty as to her desires given the unexpected
gravity of the situation and her husband's initial consent to the transfusion.65
The court stated that competent people have every right to refuse medical
treatment even to the point of sacrificing their own life as long as it is clear that
that is what they truly wish.66 Nevertheless, when balancing the state's interest
in preserving life against the woman's right to refuse treatment, the court found
that there was enough uncertainty due to factors such as the husband providing
initial consent and declining to answer the judge when asked if additional
blood should be refused to foreclose a clear violation.67 Yet again, the court
found it important to clearly state that the right to refuse medical treatment is
protected not only by the common law, but also by the federal and state
constitutions.68
In a similar case, In re Martin,69 the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the
right to refuse even life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent person.70 The
court used a subjective standard, rather than what a reasonable or average
person might choose, to effectuate a patient's right to self-determination. 71 The
58. Id. at 800.
59. Id.
60. 674 A.2d 821 (Conn. 1996).
61. Id. at 831.
62. Id. at 831-32.
63. Id. at 832.
64. 611 A.2d 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
65. Id. at 1152-53.
66. Id. at 1153.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 1151.
69. 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
70. Id. at 406.
71. Id. at 407-08.
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court reasoned that the ethical basis of informed consent is rendered
meaningless if "after receiving all information necessary to make an informed
decision, the patient is forced to choose only from alternative methods of
treatment and precluded from foregoing all treatment whatsoever." 72 In this
particular case, the patient was not allowed to refuse treatment because there
was not clear and convincing evidence that this would be his decision were he
competent.73
However, in two cases concerning prisoners, their right to refuse medical
treatment while incarcerated was recognized. In Thor v. Superior Court,74 a
quadriplegic refused medical treatment, which consequently created a
substantial risk of death. The Supreme Court of California held that a patient
retains the right to make subjective treatment decisions if she understands the
circumstances regardless of the wisdom or rationality of those decisions.76 The
court did not recognize "an unqualified or undifferentiated policy of preserving
life at the expense of personal autonomy," because if self-determination is to
have any meaning, "it cannot be subject to the scrutiny of anyone else's
conscience or sensibilities."7 7
Thus, despite a prisoner's rights being deprived in other situations, the
court held that measures undertaken "must be demonstrably 'reasonable' and
'necessary,"' rather than "a matter of conjecture."78 With no overriding state
interest, the court could not support forcing on an inmate an unwanted
treatment that involved its own substantial surgical procedure, caused
discomfort, and created additional risks.7 9 Likewise, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal of Florida upheld a prisoner's right to refuse medical treatment in
Singletary v. Costello."o Despite the fact that the court felt the injunction
sought should only be granted sparingly, the prisoner's desire to partake in a
hunger strike could not be overcome by forced medical treatment, assistance,
testing, or procedure of any form. 8 The state interest in the preservation of life,
by itself, "cannot overcome the fundamental" privacy right to refuse unwanted
treatment.82
The potential limitations on one's right to refuse medical treatment become
more complex when dealing with a maternal/fetal conflict. In particular, the
previously discussed compelling state interests in the preservation of life and
72. Id. at 405.
73. Id. at 413.
74. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
75. Id. at 379.
76. Id. at 381.
77. Id. at 384-85.
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id. at 384.
80. 665 So.2d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
81. Id. at 1102.
82. Id.atlll0.
312 [Vol. 24:2
With Child, Without Rights?
protection of third parties may limit the right to refuse medical treatment.
While a fetus is not recognized as a person under the law, subsequent case
law has created state interests in the fetus itself that may override the mother's
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. 84 As such, these state
interests in the fetus must be analyzed more thoroughly to allow a court to
properly balance them against the woman's rights and determine which weigh
more heavily.
II. DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
State interests have been found to outweigh the wishes of pregnant women
in a variety of cases. While abortion cases may be the most infamous in
determining a woman's right to choose, subsequent court decisions related to
refusal of blood transfusions and c-sections deemed necessary to save the
fetus's life have relied heavily on the state's interest in potential life. With no
case law to guide a constitutional analysis of the legal implications presented
by an HIV-positive pregnant woman refusing MTCT treatment, it is essential
to examine these potentially analogous cases. Yet whether these cases are in
fact analogous enough to be persuasive is another issue completely. Since the
case of potential HIV transmission deals with an infectious disease, in addition
to the state's interest in the fetus there is also a state interest in protecting the
public health. Therefore, determining whether an HIV-positive pregnant
woman refusing MTCT treatment is an actual public health concern will be an
important issue to tackle as well.
A. Abortion Doctrine
To properly weigh the state's interest in protecting a fetus, the abortion
case law that demonstrates the evolution of that interest must be properly
evaluated. In Roe v. Wade,85 the Court found that a woman had a fundamental
right to privacy that allowed her to choose to have an abortion before viability
without interference by the state unless the state's action was reasonably
related to the health of the mother. 86 One of the primary reasons the Court
came to this conclusion was its determination that the fetus was not a person in
the sense of deserving constitutional protection. 87 However, the Court also
found that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the potentiality of
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
84. See infra Part 11 (discussing the state's interests in the fetus that have developed from abortion
case law as well as from maternal-fetal conflict cases).
85. 410 U.S. 113.
86. Id. at 164.
87. Id. at 158.
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human life after viability and, therefore, was free to regulate or even prohibit
abortions after this stage. However, any restrictions placed on abortions after
viability needed to contain exceptions for the health of the woman. 89
Although the Roe Court found no state interest in the health of the mother
during the first trimester of pregnancy, 90 the Court in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey91 held that the state's interest in the fetus
is substantial at conception and becomes a compelling interest after the point of
viability.92 Before viability, a state could regulate pregnancy in a manner that
demonstrated its respect for life as long as such regulation was not a substantial
obstacle that placed an undue burden on the woman's right to choose an
abortion.93 However, this concern was not as important once the pregnancy
reached the point of viability and the state's interest transitioned from
legitimate to compelling. This reasoning of Casey indicates that the right of an
HIV-positive woman to refuse MTCT treatment will likely be weighed against
a compelling state interest in the potential life of the fetus.94 Nevertheless, it is
unclear how this holding creates a compelling state interest in the potential
health of the newborn.95
The Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart,96 dealing with partial-birth abortion
bans, made it a point to reiterate the Casey Court's view that the state has the
authority to regulate according to its profound interest in potential life.97 In
furthering this interest, the state may bar certain procedures and substitute
others that it feels demonstrate respect for the potential life when there is a
rational basis for action.98 Within this respect for human life, the Court found
that there lies a "bond of love the mother has for her child," which can lead
some women to later regret their decision to have an abortion.99 Despite
finding "no reliable data to measure the phenomenon," the Court used the issue
of regret as another justification to find a state interest. 00 Moving further from
Roe, the Court here appears to focus much less on issues of privacy and the
doctor-patient relationship. Instead, a state interest stems from not only the
potentiality of life, but also the regret a woman might have and the societal
interest in prohibiting a medical procedure that Congress and the Court felt
88. Id. at 164-65.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 163.
91. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
92. Id. at 878-79.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 879.
95. See infra Part Ill.A (finding that abortion case law does not create a compelling state interest in
the health of the fetus).
96. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
97. Id. at 157.
98. Id. at 158.
99. Id. at 159.
100. Id. at 159-60.
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may "coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable
and innocent human life."' 0'
In the circumstance of an HIV-positive pregnant woman refusing MTCT
treatment, the issue of abortion does not arise and, thus, much of the abortion
case law's discussion of the importance of life is inconsequential. In this
circumstance, the mother does not plan to terminate her pregnancy and fully
intends to have a child. It would be irresponsible for a court to force MTCT
treatment by analogizing the potential of contracting HIV to a fetal termination.
Not only has the pregnant mother chosen to keep her fetus, but due to medical
advances the child has the opportunity to live a relatively healthy life.102
However, the abortion cases still have important implications.
The holding that a fetus is not a person has yet to be overturned by any
subsequent cases and, therefore, the interests of the fetus cannot be described
in terms of the constitutional rights of a human being. While Casey finds a
compelling state interest at the point of viability, the Court also states that the
"destiny of a woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society." 0 3 In light of this statement,
refusal of treatment implicates a conflict between the rights of the woman and
the interests of the state.
The Carhart decision seems to indicate that this right to shape one's
destiny must also factor into what society may judge to be unsavory decisions
for a pregnant woman. Large segments of society may find the notion of a
mother refusing MTCT treatment disconcerting, if not worse. While the chance
of transmission itself may not be disturbing, refusing a well-proven treatment
program that can virtually eliminate the chance of transmission may prove too
much for some to countenance. It is unclear whether this refusal would
constitute a "gruesome and inhumane procedure."104 In fact, to reduce the
chances of transmission from approximately 25% to less than 2%, more is
required than the medical treatment administered during pregnancy.0 s It is
possible that significant interventions-c-section, avoiding breastfeeding, and
postnatal treatment-could be utilized independently in order to reduce the
chance of the newborn becoming HIV-positive.106
101. Id. at 157.
102. See Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 236 (stating that if all goes well with a child's medication
regimen, the child will experience minimal side effects, if any, and an undetectable viral load).
103. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
104. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 141.
105. The original drug treatment plan alone was found to reduce the transmission rate to nearly 8%.
Connor et al., supra note I1, at 1176. The use of a c-section delivery, eliminating breastfeeding, and
postnatal treatment reduced the transmission rate to under 2%. Achievements in Public Health, supra
note 13.
106. With a standard of care that is known to be effective already determined, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to ethically justify clinical trials determining the success of utilizing only certain parts of that
standard.
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In considering the Court's concern over a woman's potential regret, it is
conceivable that another court may find that a woman who wishes to give birth
and raise a child may be just as likely to regret her decision if it ultimately
caused her child to contract a potentially deadly disease.lo7 However, a
pregnant woman who knows that she is HIV-positive may understand the risks
of transmission and the type of life her child would have if the child were to
contract the disease. Moreover, in terms of the state's interest, this is not the
life-and-death decision that accompanies an abortion. A state interest in the
potentiality of life should not justify governmental compulsion for a fetus that
will ultimately live simply out of concern over regret. The advances made in
HIV treatment, which allow for the possibility of a long and healthy life if
treatment plans are followed appropriately, os should make it difficult for a
court to force treatment to reduce the chance of HIV transmission simply due
to concerns over a mother's potential regret.
Even a concern about coarsening societyl 09 should not be seen as
providing justification for forced MTCT treatment. Otherwise, it opens the
door for courts to impose moral judgments on citizens. In the case of an HIV-
positive pregnant woman, compelling treatment may actually further stigma
and inaccurate understanding of the disease, arguably coarsening society to
those who are HIV-positive.
B. Compelled Medical Treatment Jurisprudence
If a court considers forcing MTCT treatment, it will look to why courts
have justified forcing pregnant women to undergo unwanted medical
treatments in the past. Despite the fact that a c-section is a major surgery that
has significant risks, courts have found it necessary to order women to undergo
the procedure against their will in certain circumstances. In Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding County Hospital Authority,"0 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that
a viable unborn child had a right to state protection under the U.S. Constitution
and, as such, this viable fetus's right to life outweighed the intrusion of giving
a pregnant woman an unwanted c-section and any necessary blood
transfusions.' Physicians testified that if natural childbirth were attempted,
the fetus had a 99% chance of death, and the mother's chance of surviving was
no better than 50%, whereas both had a nearly 100% chance of survival with a
107. See Margo Kaplan, "A Special Class ofPersons ": Pregnant Women's Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 177 (2010) (discussing the possibility
that a chronic disease may raise moral issues at least as serious as the choice of an intact dilation and
evacuation procedure over another abortion method).
108. Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 236.
109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
I10. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
111. Id. at 458-60.
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c-section.l12 Therefore, the court ordered that if the woman came to the
hospital seeking emergency delivery services, the hospital was to take custody
of the fetus and perform any services deemed necessary to save the life of that
fetus." 3 In this case, the "inseparable" nature of the lives of the mother and
fetus meant that the state interest in protecting the potential life was invariably
intertwined with saving the mother's life as well.'14 On the other hand, refusing
MTCT treatment does not present an analogous scenario of two lives fixed
together and both in danger.
Despite the fact that the Jefferson court found the state interest in the life
of the fetus to warrant unwanted intervention, it is important to note that the
court denied a request to order the woman to return to the hospital and submit
to the surgery prior to the start of the natural labor.'15 With a compelling state
interest and the mother's rights outweighed, the court refused to compel
treatment. Instead, the court opted to wait for the woman to return
voluntarily to the hospital and once services had been rendered, the hospital
was deemed to be within its right to perform the procedures it felt were
necessary to ensure the fetus's survival.'1 If a court is unwilling to take a
woman into custody and force treatment when fetal life is potentially in
jeopardy, it seems that a court would be even more unwilling to do so when
there is no life hanging in the balance.
The District Court in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional
Medical Center"'8 did not adopt this approach. After a woman seeking
intravenous fluids refused to undergo the c-section the hospital had advised,
she returned home to complete her natural home birth.119 Yet, the court held
that because labor had begun, the state's interest in the fetus clearly
outweighed any constitutional right to refuse treatment and, thus, ordered law
enforcement to retrieve the woman from her house and to return her to the
hospital.120 Relying on the abortion case law, the court reasoned that if a
woman can be forced to bear a child she does not want because it has reached
viability, then it is less of an imposition to require one method of birth over
another. 121 As such, it seems that the court felt the woman's desire to deliver
the child actually strengthened the case for intervention and supported state
action. While the facts and issues were similar to a case where an HIV-positive
112. Id. at 458.
113. Id. at 460.
114. Id. at 458.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 460.
117. Id.
118. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
119. Id.at1249.
120. Id. at 1250-51.
121. Id. at 1251-52.
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woman wishes to deliver her child without MTCT treatment, the Pemberton
court relied on the state's consideration of a "baby's interest in living,"
entangling it with the state interest in life, to outweigh the mother's interest in
resisting the procedure.' 22
Although the rationale of the Pemberton court may not be as troubling as
that found in Jefferson, the actions taken give ample reason for concern. Not
only was the mother forced to undergo invasive surgery that had substantial
risks for her, but was also physically forced from her home in order to be
subjected to this procedure. The implications of courts ordering women taken
from their home against their will and being forced to undergo treatment they
have refused could have damaging effects on women's trust in hospitals,
physicians, and the courts.123 Moreover, this order came down in spite of the
fact that the risks associated with natural birth were uncertain at best. Varying
testimony placed the risk of uterine rupture from natural birth, which itself is
not certain to produce fetal death, at anywhere from 2% to 60%. Nevertheless,
the court held that "regardless of whether the actual risk of the baby's death
was one percent or six percent or sixty percent, the risk was substantial." 24 To
apply this approach regarding the risk of death to the possibility of transmitting
HIV would be inaccurate and could have potentially damaging effects. The
possibility that a newborn acquires HIV because the mother refuses medical
treatment and the potential for death from refusing a c-section are not the same.
To treat them as such is misleading and harms efforts to educate the public on
HIV and its effects.125
The Jefferson and Pemberton courts claim to balance the woman's interest
against that of the state. Yet the reasoning used seems to imply that once
viability has been reached, the woman's interest can almost always be
outweighed. 126 This clear lack of respect for a woman's autonomy disregards
the judicial recognition of constitutional liberty interests, which may be limited
122. Id. at 1252.
123. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that court-ordered c-sections
erode the trust between a pregnant woman and her physician while driving women at high risk of
complications during pregnancy and childbirth out of the health care system in hopes of avoiding
coerced treatment (citing Brief for American Public Health Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 87-609))). See infra Part Ill.B (discussing
the public health implications of compelling treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women in more depth).
124. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1257.
125. See infra Part 1II.B (describing the effects on stigma and HIV education this type of ruling
could have).
126. This logic appears to follow the language from Casey that "a woman who fails to act before
viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child." Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992). However, not only does this
language imply that it is merely a theory and not a holding, it is in the context of abortion, rather than
medical decision-making. Additionally, refusing treatment that would reduce the risk of transmitting
HIV presents no risk of death to the fetus. See infra Part IIL.A (discussing the difference in the state's
interest in the life of the fetus and the health of the fetus).
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in certain circumstances but not completely extinguished at viability. This
recognition of a woman's rights can be found more adequately discussed in In
re A. C,127 where a woman dying of cancer had consented to a c-section at
twenty-eight weeks but the procedure was performed at twenty-six and one-
half weeks when she became severely ill.128 While this case is not about
refused medical treatment because the woman consented to the same procedure
for the specific purpose of saving the fetus, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia felt that conducting the c-section one and one-half weeks
early required a new expression of consent out of respect for her right to
autonomy.129 Since the woman was too heavily sedated for the hospital to be
certain of her wishes, the court still felt that her choices must be followed and,
therefore, substituted judgment must be utilized to ascertain what her decision
would have been.' 30 So while this woman did not refuse treatment, thereby not
necessarily defying what may be seen as morally right, the court did emphasize
that only in extremely rare circumstances should a court override a woman's
decision to forgo major surgery such as a c-section.131
This is a position that the Appellate Court of Illinois supported in In re
Baby Boy Doe,132 which determined that c-sections present harms to a
woman's health and are too invasive to allow her refusal to be overridden by
whatever rights a fetus may have. 33 In fact, the Baby Boy Doe court felt
decisions coming to a contrary conclusion, including the Jefferson decision,
did not properly weigh the magnitude of the right to refuse treatment. 134 The
Baby Boy Doe court emphasized that creating additional risks to the woman by
forcing her to undergo c-section surgery was in direct opposition to her
constitutional rights to refuse unwanted medical treatment.135
The A.C. court thought it would be prudent to issue an opinion despite the
death of both the fetus and mother in hopes that it would guide courts in future
situations where a woman is either incapable of consenting to treatment or
refuses treatment.136 The A.C. court's contention that no one should be
compelled to save a fetus because no person may be compelled to save another
127. See A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44 (examining the legal history of a person's right to refuse
medical treatment and disagreeing with the notion that a fetus could have rights superior to those of a
person who has already been born).
128. Id. at 1238.
129. Id. at 1237 (stating that the patient has the right to decide what is to be done to them in
virtually all cases).
130. Id. at 1237, 1239.
131. Id. at 1252.
132. 632 N.E.2d 326 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
133. Id. at 330.
134. Id. at 332-33 (including the Jefferson court in the discussion of courts lacking a recognition of
the constitutional dimension of the right to refuse treatment).
135. Id. at 333 ("it appears that a forced cesarean section undertaken for the benefit of the fetus,
cannot pass constitutional muster").
136. SeeA.C,573 A.2dat 1242.
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living person1 37 should be strongly considered in the case of an HIV-positive
pregnant woman's refusal to submit to MTCT treatment. It would be
problematic for courts to insist that a fetus, which is not legally recognized as a
person, should have rights "superior to those of a person who has already been
born."l38 However, the A.C. court felt no need to address whether "lesser
invasions," such as blood transfusions, may be permitted, 139 a stance the Baby
Boy Doe court again chose to follow.140
Whereas the Baby Boy Doe court felt that a blood transfusion was a
"relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedure," 41 the court in In re Fetus
Brown found the procedure invasive enough to unconstitutionally violate a
person's bodily integrity.142 In balancing the rights of the woman with the
interests of the state, the court felt it was unable to impose a legal obligation on
a pregnant woman to consent to an unwanted medical procedure. 143 The court
found state interests in protecting the autonomy of the individual and in
preserving and promoting one's liberty interest, 144 state interests that appear to
be left out of the balancing equation quite frequently. Additionally, the court
questioned the prudence of enforcing these court orders.145 For example, the
woman in Brown tried to resist the transfusion and consequently was "yelled at
and forcibly restrained, overpowered and sedated."146 Perhaps a more practical
method of enforcement, a contempt citation for refusing to adhere to an
injunction requiring the mother to consent, would compel compliance by
imposing a fine, imprisonment, or another sanction.147 Again, the court
questions the "efficacy of a court order requiring a blood transfusion for
someone who is facing death," 48 illustrating the failure of such orders to
actually accomplish the goal of forcing the refused treatment.
The practicalities of enforcing a court order to undergo treatment to
prevent HIV transmission also present clear legal and ethical concerns. A full
treatment schedule must be strictly adhered to over months, and there is a
chance that this may only be accomplished by physical force or its equivalent.
While major surgery such as a c-section may be more of a direct invasion into
one's bodily integrity, forced treatment could create a continuous invasion over
weeks due to the necessity of a lengthy medication regimen. Although each
137. Id. at 1243-44.
138. Id at 1244.
139. Id at 1246 n.10.
140. See Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 333.
141. Id.
142. 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 403.
145. Id. at 405.
146. See id. at 400.
147. Id. at 405-06.
148. Id. at 406.
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individual invasion may not prove quite as serious as a c-section, the
continuous series of bodily invasions over a prolonged period of time may
cumulatively create a great violation of autonomy. The potential need to fasten
a woman down and forcibly drug her should "surely give one pause in a
civilized society." 49 Given the forced c-section cases described earlier, one
can foresee the scenario of an HIV-positive pregnant woman who has taken no
medication to reduce transmission entering a hospital to give birth and the staff
requesting a c-section as a last-minute effort to reduce the possibility of the
child being bom with HIV.150
Another factor distinguishing a forced drug regimen from that of a c-
section or blood transfusion is the effect on the woman. In situations where the
pregnant woman's life is threatened by refusing a c-section or blood
transfusion, the state's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus
coincides with the state's interest in preserving the life of the woman from
possible death. Conversely, current drug treatments to prevent HIV
transmission not only are unnecessary to save the life of the fetus, but they are
also not necessarily beneficial to the pregnant woman either. For example,
AZT treatment can have risks and side effects that range from unpleasant to
life-threatening.15 1 Possible complications include "nausea; vomiting; diarrhea;
a painful and potentially debilitating condition called neuropathy that causes
pain in the hands and feet; impaired functioning of vital organs such as the
liver and kidneys; bone marrow suppression; damage to the reproductive
system; and increased risk of heart disease." 52 A number of women that took
AZT have also experienced hair loss and vomiting blood. Moreover, a
woman with a low viral load may find little to no personal benefit in taking
ARVs to reduce the likelihood of transmission. 154 Therefore, the claim that
MTCT treatment poses little to no risk to a pregnant woman and may even be
beneficial is simply untrue. Not only do the side effects present the possibility
of substantial harm, there is a risk that the woman may develop some resistance
to HIV medications, which may reduce her own treatment options and
potentially shorten her life.' 5 If the state interest in preventing the fetus from
acquiring HIV were taken to its extreme, a court ordered c-section would also
149. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1233, 1244 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632
N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (discussing that although the state requested the court order for the
c-section, they opposed the use of force).
150. This scenario should still be more difficult for a court to enforce than the previous c-section
cases due to the lack of a threat to the child's life. See infra Part III.A (distinguishing the state's interest
in the life of the fetus from its interest in the health of the fetus).
151. Kaplan, supra note 107, at 185.
152. Id.
153. Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 263.
154. McDonald & Kirkman, supra note 26, at 581 (describing a woman who knew her viral load
was low and refused ARVs during her pregnancy).
155. Kaplan, supra note 107, at 185.
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hold substantial risks to the woman, given the fact that it is a major and highly
invasive surgical procedure. These potential harms may result in diminished
health and possibly a shorter life for the mother, which create risks for the
newborn by impacting the mother's ability to fully care for the child.
Furthermore, the type of harm to the fetus distinguishes the case of refused
MTCT treatment from the life-and-death scenarios found in the c-section and
blood transfusion cases. Additionally, a reduction in the chance of transmission
from approximately 25% can hardly be analogized to the 99%-certainty-of-
death situations found in the previous cases.156 In the case of refusing MTCT
treatment, the potential danger is not immediate death, but rather the
contraction of a chronic illness. Also, the mother's decision is not directly
linked to a near certainty of this consequence. While 25% is high, especially
compared to the potential to reduce it to less than 2%, a one in four chance of
disease transmission does not begin to approach the severity of a 99% chance
of death.
C. Protecting Public Health
The government has the primary responsibility to protect the public's
health, and the entire population has a justifiable expectation that public health
services will be used for its benefit. 5 7 This inherent duty can be found in the
state's police power and parens patriae power. With this responsibility
comes the need to potentially coerce individuals to act in a manner that
prevents putting others at risk of harm. History shows that the government is
156. Connor et al., supra note I1, at 1176. This is assuming that a court would be reluctant to order
the necessary procedure of a c-section and prohibit breastfeeding by force, which would drop the chance
of transmission to less than 2%. Achievements in Public Health, supra note 13, at 592. Given the lack of
a life or death scenario, it would be an egregious disregard of a woman's bodily integrity to subject her
to major surgery in the hopes of reducing the chance of a child being born with what appears to be a
growingly manageable disease.
157. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 6 (2008).
158. Id. at 79-80. While the parens patriae power is one of the tools with which the government
can protect the public's health, it seems unlikely that it would be relevant to the scenario discussed in
this paper. Typically, the parens patriae power is used to protect persons under legal disability, such as
minors or incompetent persons. Id. at 95-96. Since the fetus is not recognized as a person, this exercise
of power would not qualify. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (observing that "the word
'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn"). The parens patriae
power can also be used to assert the state's general interest in the community's health, however, this
application of authority gives the state standing to sue in court to promote communal interests and
protect the interests of its citizens. GOSTIN, supra note 157, at 98. In either circumstance where the state
is using its parens patriae power, the ultimate objective is to protect individuals who cannot protect
themselves. Id. at 98. Because the court does not recognize the fetus as a person, it seems unlikely that
the state would be able to assert the parens patriae power on behalf of the fetus. While there are cases
that have asserted parens patriae power to protect the interests of the fetus, these cases directly disregard
Supreme Court precedent by ignoring the distinctions made between a fetus and a child. See April L.
Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L.
REV. 563, 598 (2002).
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not opposed to controlling individuals and restricting their rights in order to
safeguard the public's health.' 59 However, these governmental actions must be
done in accordance with the framework of the Constitution. 1o It is vital to
appropriately balance the state's authority and duty to protect the public health
with respect for protected individual rights when determining proper action in
critical health matters. In terms of state intervention on behalf of a fetus, the
question is not what the state must do to protect the public's health, but rather
what they are authorized to do in this circumstance.
1. The Force ofPolice Power
The police power is the "inherent authority of the state . . . to enact laws
and promulgate regulations to protect, preserve, and promote the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the people."' 61 The police power is an authority
that the state commonly uses in order to restrict private interests for the public
good. The police power can justify interference with autonomy, privacy,
association, and liberty.162 In terms of public health, state action normally is
aimed at improving population morbidity and mortality, either directly or
indirectly. While the state retains discretion to decide what is injurious or
unhealthy and to select its manner of regulation, its actions must still be
confined by the constitutional protections of personal interests.164
Judicial recognition of police power and of the state's ability to impinge on
individual rights in certain contexts can be found in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts.16 5 Upholding state authority to pass compulsory vaccination
laws, the Court held that no person had an absolute right to be free from
restraint because the government was instituted "for the protection, safety,
prosperity and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private
interests of any one man . . . ."6
The types of restraints or sacrifices that a person may be asked to make for
the greater good fall along a spectrum of slight inconveniences to substantial
restrictions on individual liberty. While fluoridation of water is only slightly
intrusive, given the fact that a person can alter the water or not drink it,
requiring someone to wear a helmet is a moderate inconvenience, and is
justified under police powers, with one of its primary rationales being the
159. GOsTIN, supra note 157, at 10-11.
160. Id. at 11.
161. Id. at 91-92.
162. Id. at 91, 94.
163. Id. at 94.
164. Id.
165. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
166. Id. at 26-27.
167. Quiles v. City of Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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reduction of health care costs to society for motorcycle accidents.168 The police
power can also be cited as authorization for more stringent restrictions on
personal liberty, such as in the case of compulsory vaccinations,169 quarantine
and isolation,170 and even forced medical treatment.'71
2. No Reasonable Action
Having established judicial recognition of state authority to protect the
public health through the police power, the next question is whether the case of
an HIV-positive pregnant woman refusing MTCT treatment represents a
legitimate public health concern that outweighs individual rights. While the
Court in Jacobson upheld the constitutionality of compulsory vaccinations, the
Court was also quick to insist that police powers must be based on the
necessity of the case and that the asserted authority cannot be arbitrary or
unreasonable or go beyond what is reasonably required for the safety of the
public.172 The Court went on to adopt a means-ends test that required a
reasonable relationship between the public health intervention and a legitimate
public health goal.' 73 In light of this test, the issue is to determine whether an
HIV-positive pregnant woman who refuses MTCT treatment is actually a
legitimate public health concern and, if so, whether forced treatment qualifies
as a reasonable response to the threat.
In Jacobson, the Court found that the legislature was well within its
authority to mandate vaccinations in order to prevent the spread of contagious
diseases.174 HIV is a disease transmitted from one person to another, but it does
not present the same type of contagious risk to the public as smallpox, the
disease in question in Jacobson.'75 Other courts have upheld compulsory
physical examination and treatment of persons with less serious infectious
diseases, yet these diseases frequently look more like smallpox than HIV. In
City ofNew York v. Antoinette R., for example, the court found an order forcing
168. Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757, 762 (Vt. 1994).
169. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
170. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380,
387 (1902).
171. Arguably, one of the most egregious invasions of personal liberty can be found when the
government involuntarily administers medication. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003)
(upholding the constitutionality of forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a mentally ill
defendant competent to stand trial, as long as the treatment is medically appropriate, substantially
unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the trial's fairness, and is the least intrusive means to
further a significantly important state interest).
172. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
173. Id. at 31-32.
174. Id. at 35.
175. See, e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (discussing the
airborne nature of smallpox as compared to Hepatitis B, which can be spread by bodily fluids and
surfaces such as door knobs for up to a month).
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hospitalization appropriate because the patient had active, infectious
tuberculosis (TB).17 6 Moreover, the forced detention was authorized by the
court not only because of the patient's extremely contagious disease, but also
because there was clear and convincing evidence of the patient's inability to
comply with her prescribed medication.177 As such, the risk included the spread
of a highly communicable disease, and the potential to create a drug-resistant
strain of TB, which would pose an even greater threat to the community.
The risk of a woman transmitting HIV to her fetus seems to fall far short of
the dangers to the public presented in the traditional cases upholding the use of
police power. This is not to insinuate that the potential of a child being born
with HIV does not raise concerns. Rather, it suggests that this potential
transmission to one entity is distinct from cases that pose a threat to the public
at large. A more attenuated argument is that a child born with HIV poses a
threat to eventually spread the infection to others, which makes the seemingly
one-to-one transmission more of a public health concern. However, the 25%
chance that a woman transmits HIV to her fetus is nowhere near a certainty. If
the child is in fact born with HIV, the threat then becomes whether the child
will grow up and engage in activities such as unprotected sex or needle sharing
that would put others at risk. The likelihood that all of this would come to
fruition makes for an extremely small chance that an essentially non-life-
threatening disease would spread to a relatively small amount of people. This
type of risk does not appear to reach the threshold courts have previously set in
order for the state to utilize the police power.
Another manner in which MTCT of HIV could affect public health is
through costs. As seen with helmet laws, impositions on personal liberty can be
made if the actions of some are greatly increasing health care costs and
diverting resources from other essential public health services. 178 A significant
proportion of women with HIV have low socioeconomic status and, therefore,
may not be able to afford the medication needed to raise a healthy HIV-positive
child effectively.179 The costs associated with raising an HIV-positive child are
extremely high, and with such a large number of HIV-positive women in
poverty, there is a strong likelihood that the public would cover a substantial
amount, if not all, of the costs.
Despite the apparent similarity of costs to society between motorcycle
accidents and poor people with HIV, the remedy the state would enforce in
176. See City ofNew York v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
177. Id. at 1011-12.
178. See Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757, 762 (Vt. 1994) (discussing the relevance of public costs
being linked to the actions of others in determining whether police powers were utilized appropriately).
179. See Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 240 (finding that a majority of HIV-positive women are
poor).
2012] 325
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
each circumstance clearly distinguishes the two.1so Being asked to wear a
helmet or risk being fined is different from being forced to undergo unwanted
medical treatment. This distinction becomes more important considering the
fact that a public health regulation is unconstitutional if the burden suffered is
disproportionate to the expected benefit.' 8 It is important that the personal
invasion be balanced with the public good in order to ensure there is not an
unreasonable breach of autonomy.182 This is particularly true in cases where
the state is actually forcing treatment rather than simply compelling treatment.
Compulsory vaccinations are a clear example of this. Despite being one of
the most cost-effective and widely used public health interventions, which has
essentially eradicated several diseases and substantially decreased child
morbidity and mortality, states compel vaccinations only indirectly.183 States
impose penalties, deny school admission, or, at worst, quarantine an individual
who chooses not to be vaccinated.184 Furthermore, states often allow religious
and personal exemptions, which certainly cannot be said to promote the
public's health.185 This demonstrates that, despite their effectiveness and clear
benefits to the public, vaccinations are neither forced nor required in all
circumstances.
Forced treatment, or at least confinement in order to compel treatment, can
be found in other circumstances. The typical standard is that the subject must
actually pose a threat to the community and that the risk must be a
demonstrable health threat.186 Whereas the concept of what qualifies as posing
an actual threat has evolved from the smallpox threat in Jacobson, the theory
behind it has essentially remained the same. The requirement of a demonstrable
threat exists in order to avoid governmental exercise of compulsory power in a
manner that is arbitrary or unreasonable. Moreover, this requirement ensures
that the government utilizes such power only when necessary for the safety of
the public.' 8 7
Examples can be found in treatments with antipsychotic drugs and in cases
of TB. For a person who is seriously mentally ill, courts have allowed
compelled treatment when the person poses a danger to themselves or others,
the treatment is in the person's best interest, and drugs are administered in
accordance with standard medical care by a physician.188 An HIV-positive
180. A court would stretch the notions of reality if it equated a helmet requirement with forced
MTCT treatment. Therefore, this argument of public health costs seems unlikely to be raised.
181. GOSTIN, supra note 157, at 127.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 123, 376.
184. Id. at 123.
185. Id. at 378-80.
186. Id. at 127.
187. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905).
188. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 (1990).
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pregnant woman cannot be accurately described as posing a danger to herself
such that medication would be forced on her were she not pregnant. The
woman can only be thought of as posing a potential threat to her fetus.' 89
Similarly, the case of an HIV-positive pregnant woman refusing treatment
is distinct from that of a highly contagious TB patient. For uncooperative TB
patients, the state may direct the use of directly observed therapy (DOT),190
quarantine,191 or isolation.'92 However, only persons who pose a significant
risk of transmission may be confined, with isolation typically authorized based
on disease status alone or because of risky behavior by infected persons.1
Courts ordinarily demand that compelled treatment be "reasonably necessary to
safeguard the population," given the obvious intrusion on bodily integrity.194
As stated previously, the risk to the population at large from a woman refusing
MTCT treatment seems tenuous, and the gravity of the intrusion seems to
outweigh the potential benefit of reducing the risk of a one-to-one HIV
transmission from approximately 25% to less than 2%.
As the HIV-positive pregnant woman poses little to no threat to the
public's health, with the most likely harm being potential costs to the public,
forced MTCT treatment does not appear to fall within the scope of the state's
police powers. While the police power has been used in cases involving
sexually transmitted infections,195 an HIV-positive pregnant woman with no
clear goal of having unprotected sex with multiple partners is distinctly
different. Additionally, the intervention utilized in the compelled treatment
cases is not supposed to pose any risk of harm to the patient.196 The potential
side effects of AZT treatment, for example, constitute a tangible possibility of
harm to the woman.197 Under these circumstances, the authority of the state to
protect the public's health seems to provide unsustainable grounds for the
compelled MTCT treatment of an HIV-positive pregnant woman. In reality,
189. Potential threat is more appropriate, given the fact that there is a 25% chance of her
transmitting the disease to her fetus, which means there is a 75% chance that she does not. Connor et al.,
supra note 11, at 1176. Moreover, the threat is one of a chronic disease, not a threat of death.
190. DOT is a compliance-enhancing mechanism where a family member, peer advocate,
community worker, or health care professional observes each dose of medication. GOSTIN, supra note
157, at 415-16.
191. Quarantine is the restriction of people's movement when they have been exposed, or
potentially exposed, to infectious disease during its period of communicability, to prevent transmission
of infection during the incubation period. Id. at 429 (quoting CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
MANUAL 621 (American Public Health Assoc., David L. Heymann ed., 18th ed. 2004)).
192. Isolation is the separation of people known to be infected in order to prevent or to limit
transmission during the period of communicability. Id.
193. Id. at 444.
194. Id. at 412.
195. See id. ("[M]ost STI and TB laws, for example, grant the power to compel physical
examination and medical treatment.").
196. Id. at 127-28.
197. See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text (describing the potential harms AZT and
other MTCT treatment can cause a woman).
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compelled medical treatment is likely to create more public health problems by
damaging the doctor-patient relationship, placing doctors in the position of
seeking court orders in more situations, compromising prenatal care, and
driving women in need away from the health care system.' 98
III. THE CASE AGAINST COMPELLING TREATMENT
A. Fetal Life Versus Fetal Health
There is an essential distinction to be made between the case law
establishing state interests that can override a pregnant woman's right to refuse
medical treatment and the scenario being addressed. The distinction is one of
life versus health. Cruzan established that the state's interest in preserving life
can limit a person's right to refuse medical treatment.199 The abortion case law
recognizes the state's authority to protect the fetus due to a compelling interest
in the potentiality of life. 200 Court-mandated forced blood transfusions and c-
sections in the name of this compelling interest are troubling. Moreover, this
interest is unpersuasive and not analogous to the case of a pregnant woman
with HIV refusing MTCT treatment because there is no actual threat to the life
of the fetus. The cases described do not establish or recognize a state interest in
protecting the health of the fetus that would be strong enough to overcome
such an important liberty interest.
In fact, in the cases mentioned, nearly every discussion about the fetus is in
regard to life and the right to live. Meanwhile, any statements about health
virtually always relate to the state's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman. For example, in Roe, the Court finds that a woman's right of privacy
can be weighed against "another interest, that of health of the mother or that of
potential human life" at a certain point during pregnancy.201 Any discussion of
health in the opinion is only in reference to the "important and legitimate
interest in the health of the mother."202
This interest is recognized again in Casey. The Court finds "the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of
198. Kaplan, supra note 107, at 203-06. See infra Part III.B (discussing additional public health
consequences).
199. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990).
200. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) ("[T]he government may use its voice and
its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman."); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (reaffirming Roe's holding that the
state can regulate abortion after viability due to its interest in the potentiality of life); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) ("[Tihe State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.").
201. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
202. Id. at 163.
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the woman and the life of the fetus." 203 Most references to health in Casey are
intended to make plain that state regulations on abortion must include
204
exceptions for the woman's health. This pattern follows in Carhart as well,
given that the absence of an exception for the woman's health was one of the
primary issues that the Court needed to address. 205
Even the Jefferson case, which found it justifiable to force a c-section on a
woman for the benefit of the child, focused on the life of the child. The lower
court held that it was "appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to
the extent it is necessary to give the child an opportunity to live." 206 The court
was concerned with giving the fetus the opportunity to live, not with the type
of life it would have.207 This is most likely due to the fact that a pregnant
woman is not obligated by law to ensure a certain level of mental or physical
health of the child at birth.208
Cases that have dealt with the health of the fetus or newborn when the
pregnant woman has ingested drugs or alcohol still have refrained from
trampling on the constitutionally protected rights of the mother.209 In Whitner
v. State,2 10 the court found a compelling state interest in protecting the life and
health of the fetus, which the court recognized as a person.211 Yet, the court
here did not uphold any forced treatment or isolation of the mother to ensure
she did not ingest drugs. Instead, it upheld a criminal prosecution of the mother
after the birth of the child. Therefore, this case does not create precedent for
forcing MTCT treatment on a pregnant woman. This is supported by the
court's own admission that they were not dealing with a mother simply
exercising a fundamental right, because there is no constitutionally recognized
.212
right to privacy that encompasses cocaine use.
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston ,213 where the suspects were pregnant
women believed to have ingested cocaine, the Court found an unreasonable
invasion of bodily integrity when the hospital utilized warrantless and
nonconsensual drug tests for criminal investigations and coerced the women
203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
204. Id. at 872.
205. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 161-68 (discussing whether an exception for the woman's health was
necessary in the Act in question).
206. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
207. See id. at 460 (discussing "the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human being from
meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to live").
208. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
209. This discussion focuses on drug cases, but the alcohol cases hold true to the point that the state
usually seeks punishment after the fact rather than forcing the woman to undergo substance abuse
treatment or to take any particular medication.
210. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
211. Id. at 785.
212. Id. at 786.
213. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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into substance abuse treatment under threat of criminal sanctions.214 The Court
held that it could not trample the women's constitutional rights despite finding
a substantial threat to the fetus.215 These drug ingestion cases provide a more
analogous example of pregnant women making decisions that affect the health
of the fetus that most, if not all, of society would find objectionable.
Nevertheless, these morally questionable decisions and potential harm to the
fetus that could cause lifelong effects have not caused courts to find forced
treatment permissible.
By examining the establishment of state interests in the fetus, it is apparent
that there has yet to be a detailed recognition of fetal health that should prevail
over a woman's right to refuse medical treatment. Because the fetus maintains
an opportunity to live, forcing on the mother a drug regimen that may require
observed therapy or confinement216 would shock the conscience, especially
considering that courts have refused to force medical procedures on criminals
even when they are purportedly in pursuit of justice and truth.
Although the following cases may not appear to parallel the issues
surrounding a pregnant woman and her fetus, it is important to note where
courts have drawn lines with regard to forced medical treatment. For example,
in Rochin v. California,2 17 the Supreme Court stated that forcing a suspect to
submit to a stomach pump without consent was beyond civilized conduct
despite police officers witnessing him swallowing morphine capsules to
destroy evidence.218 Similarly, in Winston v. Lee,219 the Court refused to
compel an alleged robber to undergo surgery in order to remove a bullet in his
chest and to confirm his crime because to do so would be an invasion of bodily
integrity too intrusive to permit.220
Given the hesitation that the Supreme Court has shown toward forcing
medical treatment on criminals, it is disturbing to think that pregnant women
"guilty" of nothing more than becoming HIV-positive at some point in their
lives would be held in less regard. If the quest for truth and justice and the
state's interest in protecting society from criminals are not compelling enough
to force medical treatment, it seems illogical to hold that reducing the chance
of a fetus acquiring a chronic disease should pass constitutional muster. These
cases illustrate the importance of drawing a line where the state's interest
cannot completely extinguish a person's right to be free from bodily invasion,
214. Id. at 78-80.
215. See id. at 86.
216. See Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 236-37 (discussing the difficulty that pregnant women who
voluntarily undergo MTCT treatment have in complying with the lengthy and demanding treatment
schedule).
217. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
218. Id. at 173.
219. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
220. Id. at 764-66.
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even when the health of a fetus is involved. To find otherwise and to ignore the
liberty and autonomy of a pregnant woman by forcing MTCT treatment by
court order "would be to afford brutality the cloak of the law." 22 1
B. Words of Warning from Public Health
In another case related to fetal health, Johnson v. State,222 the Supreme
Court of Florida invalidated an interpretation of a law that would have allowed
criminal prosecution of women for transferring drugs to their baby after birth
but before the umbilical cord was severed.223 One of the primary concerns of
the court was that this policy, aimed at improving fetal health, would actually
have the opposite effect.224 Fear of prosecution could cause a woman whose
addiction was too overpowering to abort the fetus or avoid the health care
system entirely, separating an unhealthy newborn from those who could best
address the baby's health needs.225 Looking at legislative history, the court
recognized that the legislature specifically rejected criminalization for this
reason, and the court felt that the most effective approach to the public health
problem would be education and treatment programs.226
The decision over whether or not to compel MTCT treatment carries must
be made in light of the same potential public health hazards. Forced medical
treatment could drive HIV-positive women and newborns who may have HIV
from the health care system, creating more of a public health problem. Most
HIV-positive women are women of color and are poor,227 and many in these
communities already distrust the medical profession and have doubts about
turning to the health care industry for care.228 Forcing medication may
exacerbate this tension and increase the trepidation that already exists between
the medical profession and minority populations, causing people to forgo
testing and refrain from involving hospitals in their pregnancies.
HIV-positive women are three times more likely to have children than
HIV-positive men, and 28% of HIV-positive adults in the United States have at
221. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
222. 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
223. Id. at 1296.
224. Id. at 1294.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1293.
227. Mutcherson, supra note 25, at 243.
228. See Aziz & Smith, supra note 21, at S234-35 (discussing the lack of trust that exists within the
African-American community for health care providers and the medical community, and the need for
culturally competent care to improve trust with HIV-infected women of color); Kaplan, supra note 107,
at 205 (observing that "low-income women have more difficulty finding a physician, much less the
flexibility to choose a physician that will respect their decisions"); Squires et al., supra note 20, at 283
(examining the effects of stigma and poverty on access to health care).
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least one minor child.229 Any anxiety created from compelled medical
treatment of pregnant women has the potential not only to deter them from
relying on the health care system, it may create a swell of fear that prevents the
HIV-positive community from seeking care for themselves or the children they
have already had. Furthermore, this type of approach misconstrues what is
perhaps the larger problem: combating the transmission of HIV in general, not
simply between mother and child. Placing a larger emphasis on fighting HIV in
general, whether through promotion of getting tested, condom usage, or some
other public health intervention, is likely to reduce the amount of children born
with HIV while reducing the number of adults carrying the disease as well.
An HIV-positive woman who rejects MTCT treatment is unlikely to make
this decision based on her desire to harm the fetus.230 With this in mind, there
are more appropriate means of reducing HIV transmission rates. If a woman
rejects a doctor's recommendations, other options are available. Continuous
education, counseling, and encouragement to speak to others are much more
appropriate responses that are more likely to have the desired impact.231 These
methods have the added benefit of respecting a pregnant woman's autonomy
by providing information for informed consent, rather than disregarding ethical
principles of medical care and eroding the constitutional rights of pregnant
women.232 While HIV is a legitimate health concern, state intervention in this
case would push society farther down a slippery slope with potentially no end
to the interest in fetal health, rather than fetal life.233
C. Relegating Pregnant Women to Second-Class Status
Given the fact that autonomy and liberty interests are accepted as essential
and constitutionally protected, the potential authority to compel treatment for
pregnant women raises the question of whether this treats them as distinctly
229. Id.
230. See generally McDonald & Kirkman, supra note 26, at 580-81 (describing the survey
responses of women who refused MTCT treatment, which included a lack of faith in the treatments
recommended, knowing their viral load was low, risk of toxicity, and distrust in medical personnel who
were perceived to be uninterested in listening to the thoughts and concerns of the patient).
231. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 335 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that urging a
woman to seek consultation and counseling is a more suitable option than forcing procedures).
232. See Kaplan, supra note 107, at 156 (stating that if informed consent is a concem, providing
sufficient information regarding the risks and benefits is a necessary step to avoid depriving a woman of
her autonomy).
233. For example, one can envision a scenario in which a woman is subjected to a court order due
to unhealthy eating or failing to live a healthy lifestyle in general. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288,
1294 (Fla. 1992) (arguing against the criminalization of mothers for transmission of harmful substances
through the umbilical cord after birth, given that every pregnant woman who ingests a potentially
harmful substance could be criminally liable).
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different from the rest of society.234 Allowing state interests to override a
pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment and essentially forcing her
to submit to what society deems to be appropriate care leaves her with less
autonomy in a manner that a man or nonpregnant woman would not have to
suffer.235 If a man or nonpregnant woman has his or her right to refuse
treatment superseded, his or her status as male or nonpregnant is merely
incidental, if not irrelevant, to this decision. This clearly distinguishes pregnant
women from the rest of society as a unique class whose liberty may be limited
if their medical decisions do not comply with what is seen by society as
proper.236 The ability to limit a pregnant woman's autonomy largely stems
from the simple fact that she became pregnant, a characteristic that is unique to
this class of individuals.
Indeed, the Casey court emphasizes that while the woman is to make the
ultimate decision, she does not have the right to do so in isolation from other
parties.237 Despite the fact that Casey focuses on abortion rather than the health
of the fetus, this type of reasoning could be extended to justify a claim that
pregnant women do not have the right to place their own health ahead of the
health of the fetus.238 Implications that women are less autonomous simply
because they became pregnant lack clear reasoning, especially when they lend
support to the notion that the state can "commandeer their bodies because of
their reproductive capabilities." 239 The notion that any woman who chooses to
continue her pregnancy to the point of viability is consenting to the
presumption that her fetus's health interests substantially or completely
outweigh her own constitutes a legal fiction that justifies ignoring a woman's
wishes and divorcing her constitutional rights from a continued interest in self-
autonomy.240
A perhaps more frightful reasoning behind state intervention, which
appears to drastically reduce the respect for a pregnant woman's ability to
make an informed decision, is the Carhart Court's use of emotion and potential
234. See Kaplan, supra note 107, at 186-89 (finding that compelling medical treatment designates
pregnant women as a special class of citizens with limited autonomy undeserving of equal constitutional
protection).
235. See id at 189 (finding that a state determination of what risks a woman is to assume for the
benefit of the fetus is a physical appropriation of the pregnant woman's body).
236. Id. at 191.
237. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). The Court came
to this conclusion because a pregnant woman's decisions have implications not only for the woman, but
also for those physicians caring for her, her spouse, her family, and society. Id. at 852.
238. Contra Cherry, supra note 158, at 595 (stating that the court has indicated that a woman has
the constitutional right to place her health first, and the state must respect this right even after viability).
239. Kaplan, supra note 107, at 149.
240. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (reasoning that "it might be said that a woman who fails to act
before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child"). This
reasoning ignores the variety of factors that may have played into this decision, or lack thereof, such as
the inability to access abortion services or incapacity to afford the procedure.
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for regret. 241 This newly created state interest presumes that pregnant women
do not have the same capacity to make informed medical choices or understand
their own emotional state as other classes of citizens. This dangerous
precedent, which essentially creates a new state interest in protecting a
pregnant woman from herself, can have larger implications outside of abortion
jurisprudence by justifying the state's insistence on what it regards as the
reasonable medical decision. 2 42 This paternalistic view places constitutionally
recognized rights at risk simply based on pregnancy, while subverting a
woman's right to make choices regarding her own safety.243
Treating pregnant women differently in terms of their autonomy and
capacity to make informed decisions about their medical treatment has
substantial implications for equal protection. The ability of an HIV-positive
pregnant woman to refuse MTCT treatment is a matter of personal dignity and
autonomy, and lies at the heart of the liberty interest to define one's own
existence.244 Certainly, "beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." 245
Yet notions of a woman's role in society and her capacity to make her own
decisions while she is pregnant are reminiscent of a time when the
constitutional protections of women were not seen as equal to those of men. 246
This reliance on and reinforcement of normative gender roles has dangerous
consequences, not only for state authority to compel pregnant women to
undergo unwanted medical treatment, but for the constitutional protections of
pregnant women.247 With such serious implications, it is vital that women
retain the right to control their medical decision-making, including the right to
refuse medical treatment that could benefit the health of the fetus.248
This danger of relegating pregnant women to second-class citizenship is
more pronounced for those who are HIV-positive. Despite decades of attempts
to educate and inform the public, there is still a stigma attached to the disease,
which often creates social hardships for those who are HIV-positive. To be
sure, HIV-positive persons, whether they are pregnant women or not, are
frequently treated as second-class citizens. They are ostracized and even
criminalized in certain circumstances.
241. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
242. Kaplan, supra note 107, at 160.
243. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
244. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (finding that choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
such as refusal of medical treatment, are protected liberty interests).
245. Id.
246. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
247. See Kaplan, supra note 107, at 193, 199 (discussing earlier cases that permitted regulation of
women's roles due to their ability to have children, and how this reasoning reverts back to burdening
women in ways that do nt apply to men).
248. Cherry, supra note 158, at 607-08.
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For example, until 2011, the Mississippi State Health Department required
HIV-positive people to sign a legal document stating that they would undertake
measures to ensure they did not become or cause someone to become
pregnant. 249 This document could be used later as evidence for prosecutions of
HIV-positive pregnant women under Mississippi's felony HIV exposure and
transmission law.250 Despite a formal end to this practice, effects of the policy
remain and it provides an illustration of the type of legal discrimination that
persists in spite of advanced information on the disease.251 For a court to
abrogate an HIV-positive pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment
would damage the advances made not only by women and pregnant women,
but also by those living with HIV. Such an abrogation would enlarge the
foundation on which negative assumptions are already based, while potentially
driving these women farther from accessing the health benefits they need.
These troubling prospects become more ominous when considering that
most HIV-positive women are minority women of low socioeconomic status.252
As such, these women largely belong to groups of citizens and persons that
have been historically marginalized. To override the rights of these women as
HIV-positive pregnant women would compound the subjugation of these
groups. Courts have an important role to play in protecting the autonomy and
rights of everyone. When examining what the characteristics of many HIV-
positive pregnant women might be, it becomes imperative that the courts use
caution in subverting rights that are supposed to be constitutionally protected.
To create precedent that conditions people's rights on these types of
characteristics would be to head down a perilous road.
CONCLUSION
While a case has yet to arise where the constitutional rights of an HIV-
positive pregnant woman who refuses MTCT treatment are squarely in
question, it seems inevitable that one will, especially given that women of
childbearing age are the most vulnerable population for HIV transmission.253
249. Susana T. Fried & Brook Kelly, Gender, Race + Geography = Jeopardy: Marginalized
Women, Human Rights and H-IVin the United States, 21 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES S243, S244 (2011).
250. Id.
25 1. See id. (stating that health care professionals were not retrained, which may preserve some of
the previous negative consequences such as stigma and the fostering of misinformation).
252. See Aziz & Smith, supra note 25, at S231.
253. Despite the possibility of an HIV-positive teen becoming pregnant, this Article does not
address issues surrounding adolescent decision-making and a minor's right to refuse medical treatment.
Legal and ethical debates surrounding adolescent decision-making can incorporate many issues,
including the scope of a minor's right to refuse treatment, including life-saving treatment, over the
objections of his or her parents. See Amanda C. Pustilnik & Leslie Metizer Henry, Introduction:
Adolescent Medical Decision Making and the Law of the Horse, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, I
(2012).
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The recent justifications utilized in Carhart raise serious concerns about the
status of pregnant women's rights and liberties when combined with past cases
of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women. If state interests in fetal
life develop into a compelling interest in fetal health, there could be wide
implications beyond HIV-positive pregnant women. There is a need for the
judiciary to recognize the rights of pregnant women to control their lives and
their bodies, rather than treating them as a distinct class of citizens whose
interests do not deserve the same protection as others. With a proper reading of
the interests and authority of the state weighed against the constitutionally
protected rights of the pregnant woman, it becomes clear that the woman's
liberty interests in refusing MTCT treatment should carry the day.
